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ABSTRACT 
This thesis studies the relationship of Japan–South Korea and Argentina–Chile to 
seek means to improve future U.S. security cooperation in East Asia. By approaching the 
Japan–South Korea case from the post-war period, I develop the points of friction that 
inhibit their improved relations, from historical conflicts, military-to-military relations, 
and economic interactions. By examining these points of tension, I explore how each 
factor is linked and why there are certain restrictions on interactions between Japan and 
South Korea. I examine comparable sources of tension in the Chile and Argentina 
case—namely memories of past historical conflicts, political stability, and trade relations
—to find out how Chile and Argentina were able to lessen tensions and develop more 
cooperative relations. The research found that when approaching the Japan–South Korea 
relationship, third-party intervention will be the viable choice to achieving sustained 
relations. Additionally, the use of confidence-building measures (CBMs) with the 
Japanese–South Korean relationship will support U.S. security cooperation in East Asia. 
The study notes that CBMs will take time to develop better relations between Japan and 
South Korea; however, the expectation is that as the partnership grows, CBMs will build 
trust and meaningful present-day interactions that will eventually overshadow past 
atrocities. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION..........................................................1 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...........................2 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................6 
1. Legacies of Japanese Colonialism.................................................6 
2. Japan–South Korea Military-to-Military Relations ...................8 
3. Economic Tensions between Japan and South Korea ................9 
4. On Chilean-Argentine Border Disputes ....................................10 
5. Chilean-Argentine Military-to-Military Relations ...................13 
6. Economic Differences between Argentina and Chile ...............14 
D. ROADMAP ...............................................................................................15 
II. THE JAPAN–SOUTH KOREA CASE ..............................................................17 
A. STRONG ECONOMIC TIES .................................................................19 
B. MILITARY TO MILITARY RELATIONS WITH 
LIMITATIONS ........................................................................................23 
C. LEGACIES OF COLONIALISM ..........................................................28 
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................32 
III. THE CHILE-ARGENTINA CASE STUDY .....................................................35 
A. FROM GREAT POWER COMPETITION IN ANTARCTICA 
TO HEIGHTENED TENSIONS OVER SHARED BORDERS ..........38 
B. POLITICAL INSTABILITY AGGRAVATING THE BORDER 
TENSIONS TO THE BRINK OF WAR ................................................42 
C. THE IMPACT OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES 
ON CHILE-ARGENTINA RELATIONS .............................................46 
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................49 
IV. CONCLUSION: ANALYSIS, FINDINGS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS .....................................................................................53 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ...................................................................53 
B. SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN CASE ............................................................54 
C. CHILE-ARGENTINA CASE .................................................................56 
D. TWO POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS FOR JAPAN–
SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS .............................................................57 
1. Factors That Could Cause Tensions to Continue or Lead 
To an All-Out Breakdown ...........................................................57 
viii 
2. Factors That Can Lead to More Amiable Relations and 
Potential Bilateral Agreement ....................................................58 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................61 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. 2017 Tri-carrier Operations Featuring the United States and Japan. ...........4 
Figure 2. The Southern Cone — 3rd Longest Border in the World. ..........................11 
Figure 3. Map of Japan and South Korea. .................................................................26 
Figure 4. United States and Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Conducting 
Show of force Screen Formations during 2017 Tri-Carrier 
Operations. .................................................................................................31 
Figure 5. Antarctica Geography and Bases Claimed as of 2013. ..............................36 
Figure 6. Tiera Del Fuego Island and Snipe Island ...................................................43 
Figure 7. 2017 Tri-carrier Operations Featuring the United States and South 
Korea Conducting Joint Show of Force Operations. .................................54 
  
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
xi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ASEAN+3 Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus Three 
CBM Confidence Building Measures 
FTA  Free Trade Agreement 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GSOMIA  General Security of Military Intelligence Agreement 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance  
JMSDF Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force 
MERSCOSUR Latin American Regional Trade Agreement 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
PANC Joint Antarctic Naval Patrol 
RADAR Radio, Detection, and Ranging 
RCEP  Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership  
ROKAF Republic of Korea Air Force 
ROK Republic of Korea 
SAREX  Search and Rescue Exercise 
SPY S - Water (surface ship), P - Radar, Y - Surveillance (target detecting 
and tracking) and Control (fire control and/or air control) 
UNSC  United Nations Security Cooperation  
WWII World War Two 
xii 




I would first like to say “Thank You” to Dr. Meyskens and Dr. Matei for their 
patience and understanding while working with me on this thesis. Together they guided 
and shaped my thoughts on the important subject of security cooperation between Japan 
and South Korea. Initially, I had my doubts about being able to write a thesis, but their 
encouragement and dedication gave me the confidence to complete it. 
I chose this topic because I believe that the Japan–South Korea relationship is an 
important alliance in the East Asian region. I have lived and worked in this area of 
responsibility through two separate tours, conducting joint operations with both nations 
and their militaries. During this time, I saw the potential of a trilateral relationship among 
the U.S., Japan, and South Korea and hope that this thesis contributes to increased 
positive bilateral relations in Japan and South Korea’s future. 
Finally, I want to especially thank my family for supporting and working around 
my academic schedule here at NPS. My wife, Deborah, has sacrificed much of her time 
in Monterey and committed most of her effort into raising our kids. Her contribution 
allowed me the time to focus on my academics and give it my best. I would also like to 
thank my family at home for their continuous support of my endeavors. My ultimate 
appreciation goes to my wife and kids for their selfless support of my journey here at 
NPS. 
xiv 




A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since World War II, the United States has been a power in the Asian-Pacific 
region, linked by historical, military, and economic ties to its regional partners. Japan and 
South Korea are two of the US’s strongest allies in the Asian-Pacific region. In this 
connection, after World War II, Japan was reconstructed politically and economically off 
the American democratic model. Additionally, since 1950, the U.S. supported the 
Republic of Korea, in efforts to stop the advancing communist threat from North Korea, 
China and the Soviet Union. Together the “Tri-Alliance” between the US-Japan–South 
Korea has fostered a safe environment in the region of East Asia for decades. However, 
economic and security tensions between South Korea and Japan still act as a roadblock to 
even stronger security cooperation.  
Post World War II sentiment between Japan and South Korea has created a lot of 
friction over the past seventy-five years. Some of these issues include the Japanese use of 
Korean comfort women after the Japanese colonization of the Korean Peninsula. Border 
disputes, such as those involving the Takeshima/Dokdo islands, also continue to cause 
problems between these semi-friendly neighbors. These issues have caused economic and 
security tensions between not only Japan and South Korea, but the entire East Asian 
region and the rest of the world. These discords persist as South Korea feels that Japan 
has not atoned for its egregious crimes, like comfort women, and without proper 
compensation, South Korea may not agree to work consistently with Japan. In searching 
for a model of success in improving bilateral relationships, the case of Chile-Argentina, 
who have successfully dealt with over a century of disagreements, may apply to the 
Japan–South Korea situation. 
The Japan–South Korea case has notable similarities with the Argentina-Chile 
case. Connections can be drawn in relation to the border disputes which plagued 
Argentina and Chile for almost a century and are also a sticking point in Japan–South 
Korean relations. Argentina and Chile also faced military pressures against each other 
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and experienced economic tensions like South Korea and Japan today. Andrea Oelsner 
reveals Argentina and Chile were able to overcome many of their differences when they 
signed the Peace Treaty of 1984, which effectively silenced past tensions and opened 
negotiable agreements for their future endeavors.1 The question raises what the 
Argentina-Chile case offers as potential avenues for Japan and South Korea to better 
cooperate with each other and the United States, even though the two cases originate in 
different time periods, regions, and capacities. 
Toward this end, this thesis will study the relationship of Japan–South Korea and 
Argentina-Chile to seek means to improve future U.S. security cooperation in East Asia. 
By approaching the Japan–South Korea case from the post war period, I will develop the 
points of friction that inhibit their improved relations are historical conflicts, military-to-
military relations, and economic quarrels. By examining these points of tensions between 
these two countries, I will explore how each factor is linked to why there are certain 
restrictions on interactions between Japan and South Korea and both with the United 
States. I will examine comparable sources of tension between the Chile-Argentina Case
—namely memories of past historical conflicts, military to military interactions, and 
trade relations—in order to find out how Chile and Argentina were able to lessen tensions 
in these various areas enough to develop more cooperative relations. The goal of this 
research is to find new ways to support improving U.S. security cooperation in East Asia 
by developing better relations between Japan and South Korea.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION
This research is highly relevant to the government of the United States for a
variety of reasons. With the regional security environment eroding from threats—such as 
North Korea & their nuclear missile program, China’s increasingly aggressive military 
and economic assertiveness, and Russia’s resurgence—increasing military stability 
between U.S., South Korea, and Japan is crucial to advancing U.S. interests in East Asia. 
Since the Second World War, the United States has been able to tie together Japan and 
1 Andrea Oelsner, International Relations in Latin America: Peace and Security in the Southern Cone 
(New York: Routledge, 2005). 
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South Korea, two nations whose views have often been juxtaposed. Japan’s surrender in 
World War II brought the Japanese occupation of East Asia to an end and with it the need 
for U.S. foreign aid to both Seoul and Tokyo. The strategic value of the U.S.’s presence 
within Japan and South Korea, during wars like Vietnam, could not be replicated by any 
other world power at the time.  
Through the 20th century, U.S. security cooperation with Japan and South Korea 
has provided a security blanket for many East and Southeast Asian countries. Even in 
cases such as Taiwan, the ability for the U.S. to stage amphibious landing forces in 
Okinawa, one-day travel from the Taiwan Straits—warrants huge strategic advantages 
against China. Additionally, the U.S. imprint on the region has also resulted in huge 
economic returns. Japan, for much of the late-20th century, was the world’s leading 
economy, experiencing what may be known as the Japanese Economic Miracle. South 
Korea, one of the Four Asian Tigers, partially mimicked the financial success of Japan 
and with U.S. support also took off economically in the 1960s. The decreasing economic 
interaction between Japan and South Korea has begun to weaken East Asia’s economic 
progress, with shockwaves felt in the U.S. and throughout the rest of the world. With the 
sudden decline in military interaction and onslaught of economic prohibitions, the 
region’s importance grows even higher. 
In the last fifty years, despite small quarrels between the Japanese and South 
Koreans, the alliance with the U.S. has continued to shore up regional security. This level 
of stability has been “status quo” for almost a half century, but now it has begun to erode 
due to North Korean missile launches, China’s rise, and Russia’s increasing assertiveness 
abroad. If a breakdown of the US-Japan–South Korea relations should ever occur, the 
U.S. would lose a significant strategic foothold in the region and leave East Asia 
vulnerable to other regional powers, like China or Russia. A hegemonic upset could also 
create a deep regional fear towards who would be next to take the position, especially 
with the recent history of the 20th century still fresh in the minds of the East Asian 
citizens. This problem continues to divide two of the US’s strongest allies, Japan, and 
South Korea, but it presents a furtherance of uncertainty for the East Asian region. 
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Figure 1. 2017 Tri-carrier Operations Featuring the United States and Japan. 
Source: Tina C. Stillions, Office of Corporate Communications NAVSUP 
Fleet Logistics Center Yokosuka. 
 
To this day many wartime atrocities continue to haunt the Japan–South Korea 
relations and breakdown any chance of enhancement in security cooperation between the 
“Tri-alliance.” 2018 headlines resurfaced grim facts of Japanese conquest of the Korean 
peninsula in 1910, specifically the poor treatment of the Korean population and the 
annexation the island formally known as Liancourt Rocks.2 These images have sparked 
another rise of controversies that South Korea feels have not been settled, contrary to 
Japan’s belief that the 1965 Treaty concluded negotiations. Increased tensions have 
incited military confrontations, for example the 2018 incident between a South Korea 
warship and a Japanese Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) plane.3 
Although no actual shots were fired, the South Korea warship engaged the Japanese 
 
2 Krista E. Wiegand, “The South Korean–Japanese Security Relationship and the Dokdo/Takeshima 
Islets Dispute,” Pacific Review 28, no. 3 (2015): 363, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1011209. 
3 Jeff Jeong, “Is ‘Radar Feud’ Sign of Future Military Confrontation between South Korea and 
Japan?,” Defense News, December 26, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2018/12/
26/is-radar-feud-sign-of-future-military-confrontation-between-south-korea-and-japan/. 
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Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) ISR plane with fire control lock, which the 
Japanese accuse the South Koreans of escalating the situation. 
In 2019, Japan–South Korea relations have taken a turn for the worst with the two 
disbanding the shared information agreement of which the U.S. is a partner. The impact 
of this decision has severely decreased the U.S.’s ability to maintain security in the region 
because of the two nation’s inability to solve their past differences. In 2019, with two of 
the largest East Asian economies going tit for tat, the world’s economy has been rocked. 
The stability of these two nation’s economies have lasting effects on the world due to 
their reliance on their exports, and with each nation disrupting another, it undermines the 
global economic stability.  
This research also benefits both Japan’s and South Korea’s governments. The 
Argentina-Chile case follows the commonality of Japan and South Korea’s issues and is 
an unexplored option to understanding future steps that may lead to a peaceful unity. 
Since the 18th century, relations between Chile and Argentina emerged from overcoming 
colonization and uneven establishment of two independent nations. Similar to Japan–
South Korea’s major issues, historical conflicts, border disputes and economic turmoil 
have plagued the two most southern Latin American nations. Progressing to the late 20th 
century, different legacies challenged the partnership through forms of border disputes 
from Patagonia to the Straights of Magellan. During the 20th century, security mistrust 
developed through military arm sales with neighboring enemies of each nation, sparking 
an arms race that propelled the two nations towards war. As tensions rose, the Beagle 
Channel incident was handled carefully and marked a turning point for the two nations in 
negotiations. The Peace Treaty of 1984 secured the two nations security without any 
wars. This was obtained through extended periods of trial and error. Furthermore, the 
Chile-Argentina model shares many similarities with the Japan–South Korea case that 
can be used to further develop U.S. involvement and the notion of improved security 
cooperation as the center piece.  
Finally, this investigation is useful to policymakers in other countries that undergo 
similar tensions like the historical conflicts, poor military relations, and economic 
differences. The Chile and Argentina case can helpful because it shares many parallels 
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with Japan and South Korea and the relation to the past. The clear overlapping tensions of 
the two cases are especially useful to research because in the South American case, there 
was a path to peaceful resolution. The takeaways that may be obtained by this research 
are positive bilateral relations, improved regional security cooperation and heightened 
economic development. By undertaking this research, many benefits may be discovered 
and formulated to foster positive outcomes to international tensions. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Legacies of Japanese Colonialism 
One major explanation of Japan–South Korea tensions is the legacy of the 
Japanese empire in Korea. There are three main historical cases that continue the 
divergence between Japan and South Korea. The first justification regards comfort 
women, which continues to attract the media’s attention. The recent mention of them 
comes at a time where a potential for the end of the Korean War and Reunification of the 
North and South nations are in sight. This reveals the important historical role Japan 
plays on the Korean Peninsula. Motoko Rich alludes to how historical disagreements 
between Japan and South Korea can affect future security cooperation and may push 
South Korea to reconsider their relations with the U.S.4 
The second historical issue arises from the annexation of Dokdo/Takeshima 
Island in 1905. Ji Young Kim states, “Dokdo symbolizes thirty-five years of Japanese 
colonial rule.”5 Kazuhiko Togo expands on this perspective, explaining that “there is 
total lack of understanding on the Japanese side, that the Dokdo issue is for the Koreans 
the most symbolic and representative image of Japan’s colonization.”6  Scholarship 
 
4 Motoko Rich, Edward Wong, and Choe Sang-Hun, “As Japan and South Korea Feud Intensifies, U.S. 
Seems Unwilling, or Unable, to Help,” New York Times, August 4, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
08/04/world/asia/japan-south-korea-feud.html. 
5 Ji Young Kim, “Escaping the Vicious Cycle: Symbolic Politics and History Disputes Between South 
Korea and Japan,” Asian Perspective 38, no. 1 (2014): 51, https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2014.0001. 
6 Kazuhiko Togo, “How to Alleviate the Security Threats to Northeast Asia Arising Out of the 
Takeshima/Dokdo Islands Dispute: Applying Lessons Learned from Japanʼs Other Territorial Conflicts,” 




surrounding the Dokdo/Takeshima Island dispute reinforce the underlying historical 
residue that plagues the two East Asian nations.  
The final historical issue belongs to the rejection of Japanese Tsukurukai 
textbooks in the South Korean education system, more specifically, the Korean 
population’s rejection of information regarding the colonial period and the Japanese 
claims of legal annexation of Korea. The contentious topics within the Tsukurukai 
textbooks, which supported the “comfort women” and Takeshima Island issues, ignited 
the hearts of the Korean people against anything Japanese related. Ji Young Kim states, 
“the Korean media, civil organizations, and politicians criticized the Japanese 
government for advocating a “distorted” textbook”7 Additionally, with the Korean people 
outraged by the lack of political intervention in the production and negotiation of these 
Japanese textbooks, relations began to deteriorate again. From Motoko Rich’s point of 
view, during the early 2000s, the two governments were navigating through the historical 
issues in effort to come closer together. She states that after Japan and South Korea co-
hosted the World Cup in soccer, tourism began to strengthen their bonds due to a mutual 
dependency.8 However, most of Japan and South Korea’s attempts at alleviation have 
been insignificant, as within a decade later tensions began to rise again. 
These three historical aspects allude to the erosion that has continued over the last 
seventy years between U.S. allies Japan and South Korea. Ji Young Kim expresses that 
the Koreans feel as if the Japanese never fully apologized for the war crimes and that they 
are cheated from reparations to mend these wrongdoings.9 Supporting Kim’s argument, 
Rich persists that these war atrocities continue to present grounds for Koreans to unite 
against any efforts towards creating stronger bonds with Japan. This presents an 
increasingly difficult dilemma for the U.S., especially if the situation is not monitored 
meticulously. Both Kim and Rich agree that tensions concerning the historical context 
spill over into other categories such as Japan–South Korea military relations. 
 
7 Kim, “Escaping the Vicious Cycle,” 47. 
8 Rich, Wong, and Sang-Hun, “As Japan and South Korea Feud Intensifies.” 
9 Kim, “Escaping the Vicious Cycle.” 
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2. Japan–South Korea Military-to-Military Relations 
Other authors point to the rise in tensions involving joint military cooperation 
between Japan and South Korea without the presence of the United States. Face-to-face 
encounters between the South Korean and Japanese militaries have often been blighted 
by their long history of mutual distrust. Sukjoon Yoon states, “South Korea and Japan 
have endured seven decades of profound distrust, but the time has come to acknowledge 
the security concerns and wider geopolitical interests.”10 The distrust has impacted mil-
to-mil relations due to the intense nature of potential deadly force that surrounds foreign 
military interactions. Lee and Oba consider the period of time as “hitting an all-time low” 
between the two nations after the Japanese ISR plane was locked on by a South Korean 
warship.11 They also claim that if North Korea was the glue that held up the trilateral 
relations before, now that the U.S. under the Trump administration is seeking diplomacy 
with Pyongyang, all of the prior work may be undone.12 
Multilateral security and military coordination between Japan and South Korea 
need to be considered beyond the immediate region. Sukjoon Yoon believes the benefits 
which could evolve naturally out of improving multinational military cooperation would 
be immeasurable for the three allies the U.S., Japan and South Korea.13 Capabilities that 
are currently engaged are: monitoring illegal ship-to-ship oil transfers between Chinese 
oil tankers and North Korean ships in the East China Sea, sortieing unauthorized flights 
by Russian spy planes over the East Sea and combining anti-ballistic missile defenses in 
efforts to contain North Korean advances. The large scope of defense these capabilities 
provide to the world raise the importance of the relationship of Japan and South Korean 
militaries. Helene Cooper writes, “Washington and Seoul have canceled … in order to 
 
10 Sukjoon Yoon, “Rethinking Japan-South Korea Defense Relations,” The Diplomat, March 2, 2019, 
https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/rethinking-japan-south-korea-defense-relations/. 
11 Ji-Young Lee and Mintaro Oba, “Japan-Korea Relations: Hitting an All-Time Low,” Comparative 
Connections 21, no. 1 (May 2019): 105–14, http://cc.pacforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/
12_1901_JapanKorea.pdf. 
12 Yoon, “Rethinking Japan-South Korea Defense Relations.” 
13 Yoon. 
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avoid roiling Pyongyang.”14 She brings up the added factor of the U.S. political relations 
with neighboring nations and that diplomacy effects how allies interact in the meanwhile. 
The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, New Zealand, Australia, 
Japan, and South Korea all contribute surveillance aircraft and staff to support operations 
to deter North Korean development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and is 
implemented by the United Nations Security Cooperation (UNSC) resolution.15 
However, with the Trump administration set on denuclearization, all partners could be set 
aside, leaving Japan and South Korea to manage themselves, without the U.S. as a 
mediator. As the U.S. presence fades, the mil-mil relations follow as South Korea backed 
down from the Intelligence Sharing Pact in late August of 2019.16 Christy Lee points out 
with the lack of U.S. intervention, the erosion of military relations has not only affected 
bilateral affairs, but it has decreased the ability to address the nuclear threat North Korea 
poses.17 Moreover, the bilateral affairs weaken the regional security as well as the 
economic nature between Japan and South Korea. 
3. Economic Tensions between Japan and South Korea 
As economic pacts between the Japanese and South Koreans deteriorate, the loss 
of trade has worldly impacts. Authors like Christy Lee and Lee Seong-hyon claim that 
these economic trade tensions, may not be politically drive, but they are “undermining 
regional stability.”18 In a series of trade wars, food, tourism and vital materials, ramp up 
the economic factor and affect not only the region, but the world’s economic growth. In 
two articles, Ji-young Lee states that while the trade tensions may not appear to be 
politically driven, they must eventually be acknowledged by Tokyo and Seoul otherwise 
 
14 Helene Cooper, “Pentagon Again Suspends Large-Scale Military Exercises with South Korea,” New 
York Times, March 1, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/01/world/asia/us-military-exercises-south-
korea.html. 
15 Yoon, “Rethinking Japan-South Korea Defense Relations.” 
16 Cooper, “Pentagon Again Suspends Large-Scale Military Exercises with South Korea.” 
17 Christy Lee, “Seoul-Tokyo Trade Tension Could Complicate US Efforts on North Korea 
Denuclearization,” Voice of America News, July 11, 2019, ProQuest. 
18 Lee. 
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the world may experience another recession. Furthermore, most authors agree that the 
U.S. has stepped back in its role as “mediator,” between Seoul and Tokyo, leaving Japan 
and South Korea to fend for themselves, which only fuels the rise of regional 
instability.19 
Lee Seong-hyon claims although economic regulations between the two nations 
has grown steadily over the 21st century, with the reemergence of the historical 
controversies South Korea’s tourism in Japan has declined significantly. These shifting 
international interactions cause Japan and South Korea to impose trade embargos, 
especially when the U.S. is not around to mitigate tensions. Ji-young Lee notes relations 
between the two nations are “Hitting an all-time low.”20 In her view, this is because in 
the past Tokyo and Seoul could always rely on U.S. financial support to fill in gaps that 
may have opened during bouts with each other.21 Conclusively, the two nations continue 
a vicious spiral downward in relations and do not seem to have a clear path to improving 
any relations. 
4. On Chilean-Argentine Border Disputes  
Border disputes between Chile and Argentina date back to the late 19th century 
and have divided the nations. Over the history of Chile and Argentina relations, a key 
sticking point has been disagreements over the ownership of Patagonia, the Beagle 
Channel, and portions of Antarctica. Oelsner and Howkins discuss how these tensions 
caused significant effects around the world and the need for 3rd party intervention at times 
to close the book on disagreements. According to Howkins the discrepancies between 
each nation’s territorial claims and the lack of geographical evidence led to continued 
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disagreements.22 Oelsner posits that had these border disputes been given more attention 
earlier on, later political and military issues would not have developed.23 
 
Figure 2. The Southern Cone — 3rd Longest Border in the World. 
Source: CIA Factbook. 
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The disputes over the 3rd longest border in the world created a historical rivalry 
between Chile and Argentina, which can be attributed to invalid treaties. Oelsner refers to 
multiple border treaties attempted by each nation, as “poorly designed and with no future 
legitimacy.”24 The historical rivalry regarding the disputed Patagonia territories and 
Beagle Channel, plagued the southern cone repeatedly as each nation attempted to solve 
the issue diplomatically and scientifically. However, the underlying issue that Chile and 
Argentina faced concerned their geographical closeness to Antarctica and the fact it had 
not yet been claimed. Howkins discusses the “scramble for Antarctica,” which took place 
in 1946–47 as the nations of Chile, Argentina, the United States and Great Britain vied 
for “effective occupation.”25 With so much on the line for these developing countries, 
Chile and Argentina eroded any hope of mutual relations for the next few decades.  
Eventually, Chile and Argentina border tensions increased to the point of a 
potential regional war because neither nation could diplomatically trust the other. Oelsner 
claims the mutual perception between Chile and Argentina reflected a view of adversaries 
and potential enemies, which continued to grow over decades of mistrust.26 Having 
differing claims regarding Patagonia, the Beagle Channel waterways within the Magellan 
straights, and the Antarctic conquest, Chile and Argentina found themselves unable to 
fully read the other’s intentions. Oelsner describes the anxiety of each nation, when 
considering how the other may react towards the border, as a major factor behind a 
regional arms race in Latin America.27 However, with political agendas shifting and 
military coups occurring in Chile in 1973 and in Argentina in 1976, there was a release in 
pressure on the border. A brief positive negotiation period formed between the two 
dictators, Augusto Pinochet of Chile and General Reynaldo Bignone of Argentina, as 
they attempted to run their countries in the newly formed authoritarian regimes.28 
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Conversely, following each country’s transition to democracy, more effective diplomacy 
was applied to the border dispute issues and stronger, more valid, treaties were written 
and upheld. 
5. Chilean-Argentine Military-to-Military Relations 
One major explanation for poor military relations was mutual mistrust between 
Chile and Argentina due to competing border claims, which spurred an arms race. In 
1902, The governments of Chile and Argentina signed the “May Pacts” with the support 
of the British as a 3rd party intervener, in an attempt to reduce the chaotic increase in 
naval weaponry and military forces that were amassing.29 Yet a few decades later, 
expeditions to Antarctica continued to disrupt the political actions of Chile and Argentina 
regarding the issue of border disputes. As Howkins notes the strategic interest in 
establishing legitimacy on the Antarctic Peninsula drove up rising military tensions, 
especially due to the U.S. and Great Britain competition over the region as well.30  
Another scholarly explanation of what caused troubled military relations were 
Chile and Argentina’s unstable political systems. In the mid-1900s, Argentina and Chile 
both experienced coups that had resonating effects on the attempts for closer military 
relations and the settlement of border disagreements. A positive situation initially 
developed between the two nations, which quickly established economic trade and 
political partnership deals.31 While these negotiations sounded great on paper, they were 
not designed to hold up given the state of either government after the coup.32  
The third causal factor scholars highlight for incompatible military partnerships 
were Chile and Argentina’s inability to effectively agree on concrete treaties. The 
progression of controversies continued through the later 19th century, where Chile and 
Argentina continued to fall in and out of negotiations for peace. Treaties were signed but 
they held no weight and usually lasted less than a decade leaving tensions between armies 
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high. The lack of consistency drove the arms race between the militaries to extremes and 
caused incidents like the 1965 border dispute within the Beagle Channel to occur. 
Scholars agree that even after the 1984 Peace and Friendship Treaty was ratified it took 
decades for military relations to warm. Oelsner claims this result was due to “sporadic 
attempts and frequent rhetoric, of the states failing to trust each other.”33 However, both 
Howkins and Oelsner claim the difference was clear, the Peace Treaty of 1984 allowed a 
sense of relief to form and eventually gave way to more positive military relations 
between Chile and Argentina.  
6. Economic Differences between Argentina and Chile 
One explanation for Chile and Argentina’s ability to economically develop after 
independence is related to their available natural resources. Mikael Wigell explains that 
during the early 19th century, Chile exploited its limited natural resource of nitrate, which 
is used to make fertilizer.34 Unfortunately for Chile, the nitrate market fluctuated 
frequently, because farmers would cut back on its use during off seasons or depressions. 
On the other hand, Argentina discovered it had an abundance of natural gas deposits and 
the demand was high, even from its Chilean neighbor.35 Chile and Argentina formed 
trade partnerships that centered on the natural resource reserves amongst themselves, but 
these partnerships were unable to decrease tensions between the two countries.  
Other scholars highlight how the growth of tradable goods from Chile and 
Argentina to global markets fostered tensions between them. Argentina opened their Free 
Trade in MERSCOSUR, a Latin American regional trade agreement, which started with 
Brazil and later extended to Chile. Oelsner describes an asymmetry in the economic 
infrastructure and large-scale trade of Argentina that left Chile behind in the international 
market.36 Argentina with the benefit of their relations with Brazil focused on trade for 
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economic growth early in the 1990s, through the Treaty of Asuncion. On the other hand, 
it took Chile almost another twenty years to become actively involved in the Free Trade 
market of the Southern Cone. The more disadvantageous position for Chile, in the global 
economy, stimulated tensions with Argentina.37 
Another explanation for the cause of economic tensions between Chile and 
Argentina can be drawn from their transition from dictatorships to democracies. Some 
scholars, such as Zeev Maoz, tie this economic revival to the Democratic Peace Theory 
and argue that when Chile and Argentina became democracies, economic tensions 
between them decreased.38 Others, like Glen Biglaiser, claim that based on Chile’s 
experience, the authoritarian regime provided the ideal circumstances for the attainment 
of economic growth in the medium and long run and provided examples for countries like 
Argentina to use in their own development.39 Regardless, Chile and Argentina’s paths 
converged at the conclusion of each’s dictatorship, when both countries democratized and 
obtained major economic gains through partnered trading. Concurrently Erica Salvaj 
noted, that the revival of democracy positively changed both nations’ economies, and 
brought relations with one another to the closest they had ever been.40 In any case, the 
economic stability has proven itself over the last thirty years of Chile and Argentina’s 
relationship and has reaffirmed the possibility of peaceful futures for democratic 
countries that had once been at odds. 
D. ROADMAP 
To accomplish this research, I will use secondary sources—a combination of 
books, articles and journals written by scholars in the fields of history, military 
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cooperation, and economic relations—for each case. By dissecting these sources, I expect 
to find what techniques in political compromise were used in Chile and Argentina 
regarding historical disputes and assess whether they apply to Japan and South Korea. 
Additionally, by reviewing the military relations of these nations I will attempt to 
determine what factors have fueled tensions and cooperation in each case and determine 
what factors have led to improved military relations. Lastly, I will examine the impact 
that economic development and increased trade had in both cases and determine whether 
it was an important factor behind the development of more favorable relations. 
Ultimately by engaging in the above analysis, I can develop a detailed comparison of the 
two case studies and produce a potential policy proposal for how Japan and South Korea 
can develop closer relations and take better part in U.S. security cooperation in East Asia.  
The purpose of this research is to strengthen U.S. security cooperation within the 
East Asian Region. To do so, Chapter I will develop the main research question as well as 
raise the significance behind it, while providing a review of the relevant academic 
literature and a roadmap of how the research question will be approached. Chapter II will 
discuss the handling of war memories and military and economic relations between Japan 
and South Korea in the postwar period. Chapter III explores how Chile and Argentina 
settled their historical disputes and built positive military and economic relations in a 
peaceful manner. Chapter IV will offer a comparative analysis of the two cases and 
conclude with solutions that may lead to outcomes in the East Asian region like those of 
Chile and Argentina. 
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II. THE JAPAN–SOUTH KOREA CASE 
Japan and South Korea belong to a special group of nations who emerged in the 
post-World War II era as swiftly rising economies. Japan immediately took off 
economically and rose to become known as the “East Asian Miracle.” Perkins explains, it 
did so by reindustrializing and openly trading with the world following its defeat in 
WWII.41 Haggard also eludes the private sectors were monitored by the Japanese 
government but limited restrictions were set in place to allow for extreme and rapid 
growth, which Chalmers Johnson attributes to the centrality of Japanese business-
government relations.42 Following the Japanese model, South Korea launched itself into 
a similar trajectory and began its economic reformation process. South Korea became 
known as one of the Four Asian Tigers, alongside Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
settling into a superior economic tempo.43 Throughout each nation’s growth, the United 
States remained a mantle of protection allowing the two states to focus less on defense 
spending and more on domestic and foreign trade management. This freedom from 
defense spending has allowed Japan and South Korea to grow into booming economies, 
which have great impact on the world financially. 
Militarily, Japan and South Korea have become increasingly active over the past 
few decades, supporting U.S.-led exercises, and building their own individual defensive 
postures. As U.S. allies, they share unique and aligning capabilities, interconnecting 
military technology and defense doctrine under the U.S. security blanket. Additionally, 
each country has adopted American tactics from the countless military training exercises 
conducted with U.S. counterparts. From the Vietnam era to more recent events like 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Japan and South Korea have continued to implement their 
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militaries in emerging partnerships around the world.44 At times each nation has 
provided troops, supplies or geographical locations to foster new footholds for U.S. 
forces to attain strategic advantages. The strategic support provided by South Korea and 
Japan contribute to the increased resiliency of U.S. operations around the world. 
However, these interactions have limitations due to the incomplete Japanese-South 
Korean relationship. These military limitations originate from the friction caused by the 
historical legacies of Japan’s colonization of Korea.  
Since basic relations were formed post-WWII, Japan–South Korea relations have 
been plagued by many historical controversies. Cases, like the Korean population used in 
labor camps and the women as sex slaves for the Imperial Japanese Army, have raised the 
most disruptions.45 Japan’s legacy of wartime atrocities inhibit a potentially stronger 
relationship with South Korea. In the interim, the United States’ alliance with Japan and 
South Korea insulates the unofficial bilateral relationship, allowing for interactions 
between Japan and South Korea to remain peaceful and unbroken. Unfortunately, these 
uncorrected points of friction have kept Tokyo and Seoul at arm’s length from one 
another economically and strategically. It has become clear that Japan and South Korea 
are unconcerned with the United States’ opinion on security cooperation within the 
region and are determined to promote their own interpretations of dealing with inter-
regional affairs. 
This chapter reviews the relationship between Japan and South Korea over the 
past seventy years, focusing on the factors of economic relations, military to military 
relations, and historical atrocities that continue to affect their relationship. First by 
focusing on where Japan/South Korea relations have been the strongest we look at the 
economic ties that have formed over this period. Next the chapter dives into the limited 
military interactions that occur between the two nations and uncovers why there is not 
more cohesion between the two United States’ allied forces. Then, the chapter focuses on 
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the struggle of approaching the subject of historical atrocities which continue to cause 
tensions between the two neighboring nations. Finally, it wraps up with the findings. 
Ultimately, this chapter explores why, although Japan and South Korea would make 
strong allies, they have somehow not been able to completely unite under a formal 
agreement. 
A. STRONG ECONOMIC TIES 
Japan and South Korea share comparable economic features that reveal 
similarities regarding financial significance, but also their strategic role in the region. 
Economic interdependence and the development of a Free Trade Agreement between 
Japan–South Korea, within the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
and Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus Three (ASEAN+3), are a prime image 
of the relationship that has gained notoriety over the past fifty years.46 Since the Treaty 
of Basic Relations47 was signed by Tokyo and Seoul in 1965, Korean dependence on the 
Japanese economically has been crucial to its path to financial success. Japan’s Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) owed to South Korea played an essential role in their 
expressed economic development in the late 20th century.48 Overall reparations, 
amounting to approximately $800 million dollars, were paid to South Korea by Japan, 
beginning the economic stimulation South Korea used to become one of the Four Asian 
Tigers.49 However, the economic interactions between the two growing nations did not 
end with reparation payments. Quite to the contrary, they flourished into highly 
integrated trade connections and market investments. 
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Over the last half century, Japan has continued to provide South Korea economic 
support by investing in its export capabilities and developing sustainable trade relations. 
Japan’s investment in heavy industries like Korea’s Hyundai Motors and Samsung 
Electronics were key in the early stimulation of South Korea’s economic development.50 
In 1974, South Korea even expanded Hyundai Heavy Industries into a shipbuilding 
manufacturing and repair capable company, opening the door for future economic 
stimulus as the Pacific waterway’s traffic continued to rise.51 Another connection 
revealed by economic statistics rises from the tourism that occurs between the two 
nations. Japan and South Korea are noted as having the highest foreign travelers to each 
country over the past five decades, stoking the support of economic transactions between 
the countries. From 1977 to 2008, the number of Japanese tourists visiting Korea has 
averaged around 40% of the overall tourism pool.52 The Japanese economic contribution 
to South Korea has persisted despite a constant turmoil regarding historical legacies. 
During the Kim Young Sam and Ryutaro Hashimoto period of relations, 
approximately from 1993–1997, trade and investments began to fluctuate. The economic 
ties were strained when South Korea attempted to bolster economic relations and Japan 
made stark claims regarding ownership of the Dokdo/Takeshima islands. Kim Young 
Sam wanted to quit “Japan bashing” following Morihiro Hosokawa’s apology in 1994 
and maximize the economic advantages to a balanced Korean-Japanese plane.53 Talks of 
raising a Free Trade Agreement arose following the Asian Financial Crisis, due to 
multiple shifts in theater interactions with the United States. As South Korea struggled to 
regain its development, Japan took advantage of the lack of U.S. support to press for 
stronger relations.54 However, FTA talks were set aside in the meanwhile, as tensions 
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began to rise after controversy over the Dokdo-Takeshima Islands and Takeshima Day 
became a national holiday in Japan.55 Since the talks regarding FTA started, Japan and 
South Korea have set them aside multiple times following points of friction. In May of 
2001, polls were conducted in Korea to assess if Korea should break ties with Japan, 
which the result that 59.2% of Koreans surveyed were in favor of severing ties.56  
Despite the domestic friction of South Korean nationalism towards the Japanese, 
Japan–South Korean economies continued to interact and successfully adjust to the 
constant fluctuations. Gilbert Rozman raises the discussion of the spat that occurred 
during 1990s, where Japan and South Korea contested the content of middle school texts 
books that were produced in Japan. During what Rozman calls the “textbook war,” ties 
were placed in heavy strain; nonetheless, trade persisted.57 Also, during the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis both countries recovered through one another’s support.58 The consistent 
economic relations between Japan and South Korea reveals a good portion of why trends 
in trade and investments have continued to occur despite the fluctuations regarding the 
historical legacies and greater worldwide economic factors. However, with the rise of 
globalization, consistent economic ties allowed for a transition of economic superiority to 
occur between Japan and South Korea. 
Due to the growth of globalization, Japan and South Korea’s economic relations 
may have hit a critical point of role reversal. Hidehiko Mukoyama, a senior Japanese 
economist, describes the rise in globalization as another key factor to why Japan–South 
Korean relations have persisted.59 He breaks down the economic trends by pointing out 
how globalization has increased the difficulty of competition in the markets and trade 
wars. He argues that by opening Japan and South Korea’s markets to the world, it caused 
a shift in dependency where Japan products began to lose out to South Korean products 
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in many of its former markets.60 Rising through the early 2000s, South Korean goods, 
like electronics, automobiles and ships, overtook the Japanese market and continued to 
rise despite both financial crises. As globalization opened more doors for South Korea, it 
became more attractive for Japan to depend upon South Korea as its major export partner, 
especially with Japan experiencing its economic stagnation. 
Despite Hidehiko’s discovery of the emerging role reversal between Japan and 
South Korea, one factor that has remained relatively unchanged is the growing trade 
deficit between South Korea and Japan. Since the early 1990s, Japan has continued to 
provide South Korea the necessary goods to continue their export of goods, causing a 
trade imbalance to occur and continuation of a trade deficit between the two countries.61 
This occurrence affects Japan–South Korea economic relations in two ways: one, it 
continues their economic interdependency and two, it provides a consistent economic 
baseline for each nation to fall back on.62 The takeaway from Mukoyama’s discovery in 
the 1990–2010 period was Japan and South Korea, for the foreseeable future, could 
expect to see strong continued economic ties in their trade sectors, which has been true as 
of this writing. 
Economic dependency has not remained localized to each country’s financial 
sectors. Outside events, like the 2011 “Great East Japan Earthquake,” spurred notable 
growth and interaction between Japan and South Korea.63 The damages caused by the 
earthquake to Japan’s energy sector also impacted trade with South Korea. The 
aftereffects of the earthquake were seen when a rise of trade for petroleum products 
occurred between Japan and South Korea. As Mukoyama reveals, a 126% increase in 
total imports related to petroleum was reported following the 2010 report.64 Beyond the 
energy sector, Japan has shown increased interest in South Korea’s electronics, such as 
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development of their electronic sectors has spilled over into attracting Japanese 
consumers, as shown when the 2011 report publicized an 86% increase in Japanese 
purchasing of South Korean products such as Samsung and LG.65  
Overall, the enduring economic relations between Japan and South Korea may not 
seem likely given their historical disputes; however, upon further review, their 
interdependence becomes clear. From post-war growth to modern-day progress, Japan 
and South Korea’s relationship has continued to develop as if they were allies with a 
strong free trade agreement. They support one another’s markets and invest in each 
other’s innovations, feeding the research and development sectors. While they may not 
officially claim to be allies, their economic partnership portrays otherwise. Like their 
economies, Japan and South Korean militaries share many commonalities that provide 
support for why each nation has remained close despite their historical legacies. 
B. MILITARY TO MILITARY RELATIONS WITH LIMITATIONS 
Japan and South Korea are two nations that fall under the U.S. security umbrella 
and contribute to the stability the East Asian Region has experienced since the end of 
World War II. Post-war establishments set in place by the United States have structured 
the region to allow for certain alliances to form and others to persist without formal ties. 
Japan and South Korea have interacted with the United States military for over seventy-
five years, but neither Japan nor South Korea has formally agreed in aligning through 
bilateral ties. For example, Operation Key Resolve is a U.S.-South Korean bilateral 
training exercise, backed by Japan, to enforce security within the East Asia region.66 
Although the Japanese Self Defense Force does not participate directly with the South 
Korean forces during this training event, they do provide support for the U.S. military 
throughout the timeline of the drills. Ongoing historical disputes cast poor lighting on 
Japanese-South Korean relations, causing animosity to persist and limitations to emerge 
regarding the number of interactions the nations have militarily.  
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The start of postwar military relations between Japan and South Korea can be 
traced back to the Korean War. Richard Allen claims it began in 1953, when South Korea 
formed the Syngman Rhee Line, a fishing zone that sparked a clash of various military 
interactions between the two nations.67 The first interaction was facilitated when 
Republic of Korea Coast Guard ships fired at, detained and drove off Japanese fisherman, 
prompting the necessity of a military agreement. It was not until 1957, with United States 
intervention and the slowdown of tensions following the Korean War, that Japanese and 
South Korean militaries began to work together.68 The shift away from aggression 
occurred after the release of all 850 Japanese fishing detainees from Korean prisons in 
exchange for the return of 460 Korean War prisoners and 1,100 illegal immigrants, 
marking a starting point for improved relations.69  
Also, during the Korean War in 1950, Japan’s integration into United States 
security infrastructure in East Asia can be linked to the beginning of temporary control of 
tensions between Japan and South Korea about their past histories. One undervalued fact 
was that Japan supplied the United States and South Korean forces during the war in a 
noncombatant role.70 The overlooked support of the Japanese is notably significant 
because up to 1965, Japan and South Korea’s relations were not revealed as positive or 
existent. In 1965, when Japan and South Korea signed the Treaty of Basic Relations, 
some positive results began to emerge from social and economic interactions, discussed 
previously.71 There developed a mutual relationship that was focused on growth, 
prosperity and defense against the impending threat of the Soviet Union and more 
broadly the communist threat. During the Cold War, for the United States the issue of 
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stopping the spread of communism took precedence over handling South Korea and 
Japan’s historical tensions, and territorial disputes were set aside.72 
Since the 1980s, the appearance of the fluctuating interactions between Japan and 
South Korea have created a trend of uncertainty in their willingness to cooperate. Some 
years have high points when each nation supports mild exercises like Search and Rescue 
exercises (SAREX) or diplomatic representative exchanges. Unfortunately, following any 
news that involve past historical problems, the subsequent years have shown the limiting 
effect that South Korean-Japanese sentiments can have on the country’s military 
exchanges.73 This trend has continued in recent decades even as new threats, such as 
China’s rise as a stronger economic and military opponent or North Korea’s pursuit of its 
nuclear research, changed the security dynamic for the United States, Japan and South 
Korea.  
The United States has looked to their Japanese and South Korean counterparts for 
support as they would again have to come together to face the growing regional 
adversity. As Victor Cha describes, South Korea and Japan were considered “virtual 
allies” by the turn of the century and were experiencing uniting trends bilaterally that 
seemed promising.74 Yet, reemerging historical tensions between Japan and South Korea 
undermined these efforts. For instance, in 2018, a ROK Naval Destroyer flagged a 
JMSDF Patrol Aircraft with its fire control radar during a rescue operation, believing the 
Japanese aircraft was presenting aggressive nature towards the warship.75 Although no 
shots were fired, Jeff Jeong notes this is a representation of the U.S. misassumption that 
Japan and South Korean militaries will simply work together should the need arise. In the 
past, Japan and South Korea’s interactions were coordinated by the United States more 
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visibly, but as pressure from China and North Korea has risen, their individual efforts at 
defense have taken precedence. 
Another recent example surrounds the tri-lateral information sharing pact, known 
as General Security of Military Intelligence Agreement or GSOMIA. The pact began in 
2016 and continued to be a centerpiece for many news agencies as they discussed Japan–
South Korea military relations.76 The latest pinnacle of tensions was reached in 2019, as 
South Korea threatened to pull out of the agreement, pending conditions it felt Japan 
needed to meet to resolve controversial historical atrocities, such as comfort women. As a 
result, Japan and South Korea’s military relations have shown small signs of 
improvement and leave the U.S. presence questionable regarding the future of the eastern 
Pacific. 
 
Figure 3. Map of Japan and South Korea. 
Source: U.S. State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs. 
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Japanese and South Korea militaries have made multiple headlines in another 
arena, clashing over reemerging territorial disputes. Forward aggression between the two 
nations raised tensions over the disputed Takeshima/Dokdo/Liancourt Rock to new highs, 
as South Korea enhanced its naval and military exercises around the island, which started 
back in 1986.77 This increase in activity has been considered a show of force towards the 
Japanese and other military forces, as well as South Korea’s way displaying ownership 
and maintenance over the islands. However, despite these claims, relative peace remains 
between Japan and South Korea. Overall, Victor Cha considers the dispute “a war of 
words, rather than a military conflict,” because the two nations continue to cooperate 
peacefully under the United States as the lead defensive role in the region.78 
Another aspect to consider when observing Japan and South Korean relations 
derives from the aspect of media manipulation and corruption of internet sources, 
emitting a negative light on military to military exchanges. One may find it hard to obtain 
positive headlines regarding military to military interactions between Japan and South 
Korea. That is to not say that there are not any positive interactions, but rather that they 
are not publicized as much as negative ones. Many positive interactions between Japan 
and South Korea have occurred, even as far back as the Korean War, when Japanese 
forces supported the South with supplies and evacuations. In 2011, South Korea was also 
among the first responders to support the Japanese triple disaster of Fukushima.79 
Although these interactions may be puzzling at times, there are many underreported 
examples in Japanese and Korean media of supportive and aligning roles the Japanese 
Self Defense Force and the Republic of Korean Force have conducted together. 
If one relies completely on the media, it might be that bilateral relations between 
Japan and South Korea are nonexistent. However, if one looks deeper into the facts 
behind the obstruction to their relationship, one can see indirect trend lines forming. Each 
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nation operates actively with the United States, utilizing U.S. joint technology, like the 
SPY-1 radar.80 The SPY-1 example is significant because it is one of the most advanced 
RADARs in the U.S. arsenal and is capable of full integration between forces. Also each 
nation conducts joint and bilateral operations with the United States on land, sea and in 
the air, which also reinforce the importance of shared values, interest and ideals amongst 
the three nations.81 This unique cooperation between United States-Japan–South Korean 
militaries reveals the interoperability of the two nations isn’t completely farfetched. An 
example of their interoperability occurred in the 2017, through a display of force, 
conducted by the United States, Japan, and South Korea towards China and North 
Korea’s more recent aggression.82 American-Japanese-South Korean Naval and Air 
Forces came together to represent a warning to Kim Jong Un, if he did not consider 
slowing or ceasing his nuclear programs. By conducting trainings and joint operations 
yearly with the United States over the last few decades, more defined ties can be made 
that the Japan and South Korea could operate bilaterally independent of the United States, 
if necessary.83 
C. LEGACIES OF COLONIALISM 
Economic interoperability and progressive military relations between Japan and 
South Korea may point to eventual converging relations, but tensions remain in place 
preventing a full alliance from forming. The major source of tension undermining 
partnership between Korea and Japan derives from the legacies of Japanese colonialism. 
The situation is overwhelmingly complex due to the nature of the historical atrocities that 
occurred when Japan colonized Korea in 1905.84 The multiple obstructions to bilateral 
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relations between Japan and South Korea sprout from issues including the abuse of 
comfort women, the visitation of the Yasukuni shrine commemorating war criminals, the 
content of history textbooks, and legal issues over the reparations to those affected by 
WWII. The South Korean viewpoint of Japan’s colonial abuse and exploitation of the 
Korean population without full compensation is the first stopping point for many 
attempted bilateral agreements.  
Historical issues became prominent after the end of the Cold War when a clear 
link began to form from historical atrocities and international exchanges with Japan 
throughout the East Asian and Southeast Asian regions. Some examples of the rising 
tensions originate from the survivors of the atrocities, especially with the appearance of 
the comfort women. It took decades for these women to feel comfortable enough to speak 
out, but after years of feeling shame have come forward with their stories. Through what 
could be considered poor timing, the cases of these women had come at times when 
progression of a peaceful partnership looked promising between Japan and South Korea.  
The topic of comfort women usually is followed with the discussion of 
reparations to end their pain and suffering. This is notable because there have been 
multiple attempts at ending the controversy between Japan and South Korea on the 
comfort women subject, at times, even from outside support. In 2007, House 
Representative Democrat Mike Honda stated, “the Japanese government should accept 
historical responsibility and apologize for coercing young women into sexual slavery,” 
introducing a resolution that was quickly followed by the Philippines, Netherlands, 
Canada and the European Union.85 These external pressures ignite Japan’s defense in the 
matter, as Shinzo Abe has repeatedly defended the notion that Japan has already paid 
reparations, like those in 1993. In 2015, Japan, again under the leadership of Shinzo Abe, 
agreed to another formal apology and reparations were paid, once more, amounting to 
approximately $8.3 million.  
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In addition, in the past Japanese officials have made notably poor cultural 
decisions, either speaking negatively towards the subject of comfort women or indirectly 
portraying signs of disrespect by visiting controversial sites, like the Yasukuni shrine. For 
example, in 2007, Prime Minister Abe supported the claim that comfort women were not 
coerced into forced slavery and served willingly under the Japanese Empire.86 The South 
Korean response was to install statues representing the many faces of Korean comfort 
women, strategically located in places where Japanese officials worked, such as the 
Japanese Embassy in Busan, South Korea.87 Disrespectful comments, like Abe’s, are the 
main cause that reignites the spats between Japan and South Korea and forces them to 
continue down a path of uncertain relations.  
Another example of historical controversy that disrupts relations originates from 
the polarized views of history held by Koreans and Japanese. Each side has its own 
viewpoint of what happened, which only further ignites the controversy. One other area 
of tension is the portrayal of history in textbooks. For instance, the publication of a 1980s 
Japanese history textbook that “challenged or ignored some of the most sensitive aspects 
of Japan’s twentieth-century historical experience in Asia” rapidly caused many Koreans 
to shift from the increasingly positive relations with Japan.88 The Japanese version of 
history books largely left out Japan’s colonization of the Korean Peninsula and 
downplayed Japanese atrocities against Koreans. South Korea’s immediate response was 
to pull all Japanese-produced history textbooks from their schools and begin production 
of Korean-made books utilizing their historical perspectives of the war. 
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Figure 4. United States and Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Conducting 
Show of force Screen Formations during 2017 Tri-Carrier Operations. 
Source: Michael Russell, U.S. Navy. 
 
The 2019 disagreement over the Imperial Japanese “Rising Sun” flags used on 
warships is yet another example of past negative connotations and, in this case, of an 
image that represents different pasts. From South Korea’s perspective, the image of the 
flag revives negative feelings towards Japan, and Japan’s reluctance to fully accept its 
past mistakes has continuously plagued bilateral relations between the nations.89 For 
Japan, the flag represents its heritage as a strong nation both militarily and culturally. The 
different perspectives reveal why the historical clashes remain and that some acceptance 
will be required on both sides of the tensions. 
In 2019, tensions rose again between Tokyo and Seoul due to a shift in trading 
preferences and sanctions that Japan placed against South Korea. In August, Japan 
enacted new sanctions on South Korea following its court rulings for Japanese companies 
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to pay reparations to Korean forced labor from working in factories in WWII.90 This 
friction has been agitated by the trade war that was spurred following the ruling. Japan 
has withheld the shipment of vital semiconductors to South Korea, items that are essential 
to their major export industries, like Samsung or LG.91 The continued “tit for tat” that the 
relationship of Japan and South Korea experiences not only hiders their economic ties, 
but persistently limits the security cooperation with each other and the United States. 
D. CONCLUSION 
As this chapter suggests, Japan and South Korea’s economic partnership has 
functioned as a baseline for the two nations to rely on one another. Japan and South 
Korea’s FTA has proven to be an essential asset to the world as both nations are within 
the top ten largest world GDPs. The convergence of Tokyo and Seoul through their 
economic ties reveals how strong the relationship is compared to its outer appearance. It 
shows that despite their past, Japan and South Korea can work well together. Similarly, 
Japan and South Korea’s military operations with the United States are a constant that 
exposes emerging trend lines. These lines provide the groundwork for a greater trilateral 
response to growing forces in the East Asian region. As Victor Cha alluded, each nation 
has the capability, shared values and means to cooperate, it is just getting over the median 
that keeps them from merging.92 The JMSDF and ROKAF are superior forces, which 
combined with the U.S. alone can be considered formidable; however, overcoming 
limited military operations remains contingent on these historical factors. Whether Japan 
and South Korea can concretely smooth over the past lingers on an agreement putting the 
historical atrocities behind them.   
Japan and South Korea’s early 20th century historical disputes can be considered 
as the epicenter of their current inconsistent relations. The effect it has on the United 
States’ role in the region grows more challenging as the contentious relationship persists. 
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Brad Glosserman claims economic trends and limited military to military relations are the 
gateways available to support a more united partnership between Japan and South 
Korea.93 Tensions over historical issues have, however, resulted in social clashes 
between the two nations, as in the example of South Korea attempting to remove the 
Japanese Naval Force’s flag.94 The effects are not limited to just Japan and South Korea, 
but also affect the United States and all partnering countries who interact financially and 
fall under the same security umbrella. Japan and South Korea will have to take a 
conciliatory approach to historical issues; otherwise, a complete breakdown in 
interactions may leave both unwilling to work with each other in future endeavors.95 The 
evidence in this chapter suggests that tensions over historical issues will continue to serve 
as an impediment to South Korea and Japan developing closer relations. South Korea will 
likely continue to strive for reparations that meet and cover all the atrocities Japan 
enacted during its occupation and throughout the war. On the other hand, it seems as if 
Japan will continue to support the claims that reparations that were agreed upon in the 
past nullify any further negotiations. 
In the next chapter, the case of Chile and Argentina will explore two neighboring 
countries that democratized around the same time, opened free trade agreements, and 
shared similar historical disruptions in bilateral relations. The difference is that after 
decades of disruption they ultimately came together peacefully and were able to let the 
past go amicably. The next chapter will utilize the Chile and Argentina case to uncover 
where the breakdowns were overcome and develop the tools used to ensure their 
partnered success. 
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III. THE CHILE-ARGENTINA CASE STUDY 
This chapter seeks to complement the Japan–South Korea case with another 
relationship that struggled in its early attempts at bilateral relations. The case study of 
Chile and Argentina offers a comparison of two nations who strived to become bilateral 
partners but could not for a long time due to persistent territorial disputes but eventually 
were able to resolve their conflict. Chile and Argentina share the third longest border in 
the world, stretching along the Patagonia mountain ranges, islands on the southern cone 
and territories in Antarctica.96 The chapter seeks to demonstrate that the disputed 
territorial claims undermined relations and impacted two additional factors effecting the 
attempts to improve relations. First, the border disputes kept Chile and Argentina 
frequently trying to develop treaties in effort to solve these tensions. Next, unstable 
political and economic conditions in Argentina and Chile contributed to territorial 
tensions repeatedly rising and falling, remaining a major impediment to closer relations. 
Another factor which led to the resolution of territorial disputes was the use of 
international mediators who facilitated negotiations over territorial issues and helped 
establish confidence building measures (CBMs) to reinforce closer bilateral relations. 
These relations were made even stronger by the mutual economic benefits that were 
gained from CBMs.  
The race for Antarctica, starting in the 1940s, was a leading cause in the rising 
tensions over territorial disputes. Antarctica is an example of great power competition 
that involved Chile, Argentina, the United States, and Great Britain over who would 
obtain the rights to unexplored land on the southernmost continent.97 However, it quickly 
reminded the world that competition is meaningless without motivation. As the four 
nations explored the region, interest began to fade due to a lack of confidence in the 
availability of natural resources compared to the cost of retrieving them. Great power 
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competition, between the four nations, over Antarctica diminished over a decade as each 
nation refused to fund the low return expeditions. 
Figure 5. Antarctica Geography and Bases Claimed as of 2013. 
Source: Maps of the World. 
 
As Antarctica became less of a priority, territorial disputes shifted to the 
territories along the southern cone of South America and became more violent over time. 
The Beagle Conflict began at the turn of the 20th century pitting Chile and Argentina 
against one another over the Patagonia mountain ranges and Beagle Channel. The Beagle 
Conflict increased in intensity during the 1950s when Chile and Argentina fought over 
claims on the Patagonia border and Beagle Channel for the resources and strategic 
positioning they provided. At the same time Chile and Argentina’s political instability 
became a serious concern and drew international attention due to the growing potential of 
war. In the 1970s, tensions rose to their highest when Chile and Argentina had armed 
conflicts over portions of the border in the southern cone. Also, in the late 1970s, regional 
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instability was high as Argentina and the United Kingdom faced off over the Falkland 
Islands, with Chile supporting the U.K. to spite Argentina and its disagreements over 
borders in the south.  
In the early 1980s, tensions reached their pinnacle, prompting the clear need for 
third-party intervention to subdue the two neighbors. With war inevitable without 
interjection, the United States attempted to defuse the situation by arbitrating a peaceful 
resolution, which was quickly rejected by the Argentinians. Chile and Argentina rejected 
support from the United States and United Kingdom regarding any South American 
regional disputes, due to an anti-imperialist mentality built up from historical events. To 
accommodate Chile and Argentina’s beliefs equally, the Vatican stepped up and under 
the observation of Pope John Paul II, offered to oversee the resolution. In 1984, The 
Peace and Friendship Treaty was signed, through arbitration of the Vatican, pairing 
Chile, and Argentina as bilateral partners from that point on.98 
The continued success of the 1984 Treaty can be attributed to the use of CBMs 
that were implemented upon the signing of the treaty. Marcial Suarez defines CBMs as “a 
system set in place to rebuild layers of trust that had been improperly maintained in past 
interactions.”99 From 1984 on, the CBMs enabled a stronger trade partnership and 
effectively develop mutual agreements on border matters between the neighbors. The 
positive effects from third-party mediation resolved territorial disputes, stabilized 
perceptions of political intentions and joint economic progression. The endurance of the 
Peace and Friendship Treaty is a testament to the strength CBMs provide when nations 
are initially distrustful of each other and need to build confidence securely over time. 
The roadmap for this chapter lays out the historical timeline of border disputes 
and draws a connection to the success of the CBMs following mediation. The first section 
gives an overview of the great power competition surrounding Antarctica and territorial 
struggles that shaped interactions. Next, the chapter shifts focus to how other territorial 
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tensions contributed to the political instability that impacted Chile and Argentina’s 
relations. The last section discusses the impact of the 1984 treaty on the relationship and 
the positive outcomes the CBMs provided to each nation’s stability. Ultimately, this 
chapter summarizes Chile and Argentina’s tense relationship over the 20th century 
seeking to reveal the effectiveness of internationally mediated CBMs and provide 
positive evidence the CBMs may be an asset in the Japan–South Korea case. 
A. FROM GREAT POWER COMPETITION IN ANTARCTICA TO 
HEIGHTENED TENSIONS OVER SHARED BORDERS 
Chile and Argentina’s race for the Antarctic in the 1940s during and following 
WWII can be considered one of the earliest opportunities for alliance. In 1941, 
excitement began over the southernmost continent when Japan made claims to the region 
during its Pacific campaign.100  Chile, Argentina, Great Britain, and the United States 
were quick to denounce the Japanese claims and began making preparations for their own 
interests. In the wake of WWII, Great Britain and the United States began to express 
greater interest in the continent of Antarctica. Although Antarctica was given little 
attention initially by Chile or Argentina and its leadership, neither wanted to let their 
claimed rights to fall to outside nations.101 With concern, Antarctica received sufficient 
support to keep both Chile and Argentina’s presence large enough to contest foreign 
ventures. At times, the cost of the efforts to maintain presence in Antarctica included 
partnering with one another to ensure the strength of Latin America against the potential 
oppression of the world powers.102 The Treaty del Rio, in 1947, brought Chile and 
Argentina closer under the agreement to stand against imperialist nations as they 
attempted to enforce their will over what Chile and Argentina agreed to as their own 
undisclosed territories.103 
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During the expeditions of Antarctica, a new relationship emerged between 
Argentina and Chile. In the 1940s, neither Chile nor Argentina had suitable ships for 
traveling in the inclement weather Antarctica offered.104 Initially to spite the British, 
Argentina offered the Chileans a ride during their expedition in 1946. Howkins observed 
other attempts at partnership, such as when Chile refused an offer for a Chilean official’s 
trip on the United States’ private expedition led by Finn Ronne, specifically due to the 
price of approximately $20,000.105 The relationships formed by explorers researching 
Antarctica did not always align with their parent nations’ feeling towards one another and 
thus joint progress was shelved with each new expedition carried out. Even working 
together, the explorers experienced conditions that were harsh, making the ability to find 
suitable evidence of natural resources scarce and even when suitable resources were 
discovered they were difficult refine.106 
The uncertainty of what natural resources were available on the continent 
eventually drove the countries to discontinue searches and decreased pressure amongst 
the parties. Even when Chile, during their ramp-up of military arms, purchased a vessel 
suitable for the Antarctic conditions, it could not fund expeditions to explore the harsh 
unknown land.107 The price of exploration remained high, reducing the priority on many 
of the leaders’ minds when it came to supporting the expensive ventures. Altogether, the 
race for Antarctica drove the four nations, Argentina, Chile, Great Britain, and the United 
States, to seriously reconsider their partnerships and obligations to one another before 
anyone continued pressure in the region.108 
Additionally, in the late 1940s, tension rose between Great Britain and Argentina 
over opinions on the Falkland Islands and called into question the United States’ loyalty 
to its bilateral alliances with Britain and with the Argentinians covered by the Monroe 
Doctrine. At the time, President Peron of Argentina, was intent on regaining his 
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popularity; to do so, he was set on obtaining a portion of the Antarctic and/or removing 
the British from the Falklands. He believed either would give him the prestige he 
required to maintain his presidency; however, he never raised the funds to commit to this 
idea. Instead of refocusing on economic matters, President Peron increased Argentinian 
militarization, causing British forces on the Falklands to prepare for an invasion, while 
indirectly causing Chile to send forces to defend its borders. Marcial Suarez considered 
the situation the most intense since the start of the expeditions to Antarctica.109 
As the tensions peaked, the United States urged a mutual agreement between 
Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands issues. The multinational affair grew as 
Chile joined the discussions and in 1948 a Tripartite Agreement was struck between 
Argentina, Chile and Great Britain.110  The treaty declared that Argentina would allow 
the British to maintain control over the Falkland Islands without developing a major 
military presence, and provide the opportunity for Argentina to build bases on the 
Antarctic Peninsula. Additionally, Chile would be able to maintain two of its already 
established bases without resistance of the foreign powers. This United States-backed 
treaty kept the peace over the Falklands for almost a decade and allowed the race to 
explore Antarctica to fade peacefully over time and with little to no resentment between 
the four nations. 
Following the Antarctica race, Chile and Argentina shifted focus towards other 
bilateral struggles, mainly their disagreement on border issues in Patagonia and the 
Beagle Channel. Aftereffects from the race for Antarctica and its resources disrupted 
many of the previous agreements regarding the Beagle Channel and portions of the 
southern cone. In the early 1950s, with claims going back to precolonial times, Chile 
attempted to utilize history as just cause for its territorial assertions on the Beagle 
Channel.111 In 1955, Chile’s effort for the land coincided with a political upheaval in 
Argentina as President Peron was exiled. Argentinian General Aramburu took over and 
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began enforcing stricter military force on borders along the southern cone.112 While the 
border treaties along the southern cone were again trampled by regime change in 
Argentina, in response Chile reinforced its position along the border. 
New points of friction over the Beagle Channel occurred due to armed 
disagreements and led to physical conflicts. Throughout the late 1950s–60s, the border 
along the southern coast became a hotbed of activity between militaries and naval forces. 
Multiple episodes of close calls over built-up tension within the Beagle Channel usually 
ended with little to no casualties between the two sides. For example, Andres Gertner 
describes an incident which took place in 1958, the Snipe incident. The Snipe incident is 
one of the earliest physical conflicts between Chile and Argentina regarding borders, 
which resulted in no casualties but did cause numerous lighthouses to be constructed and 
torn down.113 The incident brought Chile and Argentina to the table, once again, to 
discuss territorial entitlements.  
While Chile and Argentina met to work on the Snipe Incident in 1959, it was only 
a few years before relations fell apart again, this time due to a deadly quarrel. The Laguna 
del Desierto incident was another physical conflict. This incident occurred in November 
of 1965, when one Chilean Lieutenant was shot and killed, a Sargent was wounded, and 
two others, a major and Sargent were captured, but later released.114 The incident was 
disregarded by both sides because no one would confess to who actually initiated the 
attack. However, Argentina relinquished its control over the contended area and allowed 
Chile to rebuild its lighthouse for channel safety. The shelling of lighthouses, and the 
Chilean and Argentinian forces meeting head-on, raised the stakes between the two 
nations over who would emerge victorious regarding territorial claims. 
Throughout the 1970s, tension over borders rose high enough that they finally 
caught international attention and third-party intervention was offered as a new option. 
Initially, Chile and Argentina considered Great Britain’s offer for guidance over how to 
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resolve the contested land; additionally, the United States and the international court 
played minor roles in attempting arbitration.115 However, due to existing differences 
with Great Britain and the United States over sovereignty of the Falklands and 
Antarctica, Argentina and Chile began to look elsewhere. In 1977, the International Court 
of Justice, along with the British Crown, awarded the contested zone of Patagonia to 
Argentina and the Southern portions surrounding the Beagle Channel to Chile.116 
Following an international study conducted over the areas of Patagonia and the southern 
region of South America, the scientific ruling was quickly countered by both nations only 
furthering tensions.117 The rejection from both sides revealed the unwillingness of each 
nation to work with the other, appearing as if it were becoming impossible for them to 
overcome their differences.  
B. POLITICAL INSTABILITY AGGRAVATING THE BORDER TENSIONS 
TO THE BRINK OF WAR 
Political instability only made it more difficult for Chile and Argentina to 
establish consistent terms over the treaties signed throughout the 20th century.118 Many 
of the early treaties were nullified quickly or were unable to accommodate the emerging 
relations between Chile and Argentina. Audrey Oelsner refers to their framework as 
“poorly designed and with no future legitimacy” due to the treaties’ inability to foresee 
potential obstructions. Trust eroded between Chile and Argentina, due to multiple coups 
and unsuccessful treaties involving their disputes borders. For example, in 1973, General 
Pinochet performed a military coup and overthrew the failing democratic political 
structure that Chile had been suffering under since the late 1960s. The dissent in Chile 
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over failing democratic policies, like agrarian reform and the state’s increased role in the 
economy, drove the social unrest and forced the political shift.119 
The military overthrows by Argentinian General Aramburu in 1955 and Chilean 
General Pinochet in 1973 provide examples of the chaotic state of each nation’s political 
realm.120 The goals of the authoritarian Chilean and Argentinian leaders was to prove to 
the people their ability to lead, as well as shore up their political position. The 
inconsistency of Santiago and Buenos Aires to maintain political stability lessened the 
importance placed on territorial claims, also leaving little regard for the potential of 
future economic prosperity. Thus, from the end of the 1960s to approximately the mid-
1980s, Chile and Argentina’s economies had flatlined and left economic growth stunted 
with little trade agreements to assist. 
 
Figure 6. Tiera Del Fuego Island and Snipe Island 
Source: Generic Mapping Tools. 
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The difference between the Argentina and Chile’s economic situation during this 
period came from the world’s desire for oil and Chile’s ability to supply it. As Tad Szulc 
notes, “Tierra del Fuego would have been forgotten without the discovery of oil.”121  
The unearthing of oil on the island not only began to support Chile’s economy, but drew 
the two nations together over existing border concerns within the southern cone. The 
Beagle Channel issues resumed tensions and the arrival of the oil forced Chile and 
Argentina to meet once again. Leaders began talks regarding free trade agreements (FTA) 
in the late 1950s and early 60s, which would allow Chile and Argentina to expand their 
export options.  
The Latin American Free Trade Association, in the 1960s, allowed a new type of 
connection to form between Chile and Argentina that had not occurred in previous 
ventures. The prospect of opening markets presented good opportunities for South 
American nations as the initial growth rate rose to roughly 3% between Chile and 
Argentina.122 However, the sporadic military coups disrupted each nation’s effectiveness 
individually, again causing social unrest to derail the progress. In 1974, Argentinian 
President Juan Perón made clear his intentions to settle the Beagle Conflict to Chilean 
President Augusto Pinochet; however, neither President supported this claim. The 
political pressure over the Beagle Channel continued the economic stagnation period 
leading up to the 1980s. The rise in pressure and poor growth ensured the two presidents 
coming together in an attempt at resolving the conflict peacefully under another treaty. 
The Act of Montevideo was established in 1977. The Act served for two years as 
a binding negotiation between Chile and Argentina, temporarily quelling their disputes 
over the Beagle Channel. It was not until the Act of Montevideo was ratified that tensions 
slowed temporarily, and the two nations once again attempted to work together on the 
territorial issues. The treaty dissolved when large military movements by Argentina in the 
southern cone caused misinterpretations on both sides. On January 3rd 1979, the Beagle 
Conflict forced Chile to agree to a revised version of the Montevideo border treaty with 
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Argentina because of the overwhelming military pressure and not wanting to incite a war 
during their economic depression.123 With the revision to the Act of Montevideo, Chile 
and Argentina once more silenced their aggression over the southern territory, but were 
brought into a new conflict as Argentina challenged the United Kingdom over the 
Falkland Islands in 1982. 
The decade of tensions and conflicts leading up to the Falklands War set the stage 
for Chile to oppose Argentina in any venue possible, and siding with the U.K. gave them 
that opportunity. As Sir Lawrence Freedman states, “The Beagle Conflict can be 
considered the main reason for the Chilean support to the United Kingdom during the 
Falklands War of 1982.”124 Finally, when Chile formalized support for the United 
Kingdom, tensions with Argentina erupted. Freedman notes that Argentina’s naval 
capacity in the Falklands War suffered because they had split their forces to defend the 
Beagle Channel against the threat of a Chilean invasion.125 The atmosphere through the 
Beagle Conflict and Falklands War can be linked to the underlying border tensions that 
plagued Chile and Argentina’s bilateral relations.  
Following the defeat against the United Kingdom, Argentina was left vulnerable 
against Chile. Argentina’s disadvantage only raised the tensions further with Chile, as the 
Argentinians were unwilling to allow Chile to peacefully take the Beagle Channel. The 
continued border tension caught international attention and a call for peace between Chile 
and Argentina. The Vatican offered to mediate a solution between the two primarily 
catholic countries because of the religious commonality. Argentina and Chile both 
accepted the offer of the Vatican over other propositions from the United States and 
United Kingdom. Following the win in the Falklands, Chile began to protect their claims 
more assertively, reinforcing troops and arms in the contested areas. On the other hand, 
Argentina’s acceptance to negotiations only came when they were left with little to no 
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options, nonetheless they remained stationed along the Beagle Channel until negotiations 
were ratified.  
Finally, late in 1984, the tensions were successfully quelled after the mediation 
led by the Vatican and Pope John Paul II. The outcome was a well-outlined treaty that 
Chile and Argentina would agree on. While previous diplomatic negotiations were 
unsuccessful because of the mistrust between the two nations, their religious 
commonalities offered a viable bridge to the solution. In 1984, the Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship was signed by Chine and Argentina, concluding all disputes, and setting aside 
the territorial claims until further scientific research provided evidence that proved 
either’s claims. The conclusion of Chile and Argentina’s tense neighboring conflicts was 
coupled with the introduction of CBMs.126 CBMs were set in place to ensure the 
fortitude and longevity of the pact. Following 1984, these CBMs established a strong 
trade partnership and effectively develop mutual opinions between the neighbors.  
C. THE IMPACT OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES ON CHILE-
ARGENTINA RELATIONS 
Since 1984 both nations have seen consistent growth periods and strong resistance 
to economic hardships. With CBMs in place to support Chile-Argentina bilateral 
relations, situations like the 1998 Argentinian Great Depression were successfully 
curbed.127 This can be attributed to the more defined sections and actions in the treaty. 
For example, within the treaty, under the Economic Cooperation and Physical Integration 
clause – Article 12, it states, “The Parties agree to establish a permanent bi-national 
commission with the aim of strengthening economic cooperation and physical 
integration.”128 Through their partnership and renewed perspectives towards previously 
disputed borders, regions like Patagonia and Antarctica offered new opportunities for 
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economic ventures. Sharing natural resources that these locations offered, without 
fighting over who owned them, greatly improved their export abilities, and kept their 
defense spending under control.  
Natural gas provided by Argentina to Chile, came about in the early 1990s. This 
supplied the Chileans with electricity and fuel transforming their living conditions 
drastically. The economic facet of the treaty began to break through the marred past 
relations, driving productivity and monumental increases in human welfare. 
Singlehandedly Argentina became Chiles natural gas supplier, boosting Argentina’s 
export trade numbers by approximately $336 million by 2004.129 The economic CBMs 
provided a safety net for the Chileans through the trust established by Argentina’s 
cooperation. Although Chile too, supplied Argentina with the oil from the Tierra del 
Fuego as a response to the CBMs laid out by the treaty, but the impact was far less due to 
Argentina’s involvement with the Regional FTA.130 
 CBMs continued to define the relations between Chile and Argentina and 
develop into a norm that surpassed all previously attempted treaties. The partners’ 
economic interactions improved drastically even though Chile was not included in some 
of the South American FTAs. As financial affairs within Argentina flourished, CBMs 
revealed other economic benefits of the bilateral relations. For example, Chile’s 
reemergence into the world market saw improving growth rates of 2% and up, following 
the partnership with Argentina.131 In Argentina, a positive trend in growth resurfaced, 
but the country was unable to regain its large GDP growth rate of 7.7%.132  Finally in 
1996, Chile was invited into the Southern Common Market, otherwise known as 
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MERCOSUR FTA, which was a conglomeration of South American nations trading 
regionally that had previously rejected Chile as a potential partner.133  
The CBMs provided financial stability for Chile and Argentina, solving past 
differences in the economic realm, and providing new grounds for development to form. 
Although it took time, the economic repercussions of the signing of the 1984 Peace and 
Friendship treaty was a pivotal moment in the bilateral relationship and additional 
positive results continued to persist. In addition, it assisted in lowering the political 
upheavals that occurred in each country because trust features had been established 
across the bilateral relations. Following the signatures on the treaty, both nations had 
relative growth for almost a decade, until Argentina suffered another economic downturn 
in late 1990s. While Argentina worked to right its economy, the relations with Chile 
remained strong and new practices between Santiago and Buenos Aires formed under the 
assistance of International Monetary Fund (IMF).134 This led to new ventures in the 
previously disputed territories of Antarctica, Patagonia, and the Beagle Channel. 
In the later 1990s, Chile and Argentina returned to Antarctica, however under 
their successful friendship treaty, they have formed the Joint Antarctica Naval Patrol 
(PANC).135 The partnership formed for many reasons, to include climate change, the 
support of marine animals that inhabit various locations, and general security in the 
region. As Alejandro Sanchez states, PANC is an prime example of how military 
cooperation can provide a fair share security system to a large region of the world.136 
With over 14 million square miles of land to cover, the task of PANC to provide security 
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support of previous adversaries in the region, the United States and United Kingdom, are 
welcomed help when conditions are too difficult for their aging vessels or inability to 
respond.138 Thus, providing one final example of how much positivity the CBMs 
between Chile and Argentina brought under the 1984 Peace and Friendship Treaty. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Through the examination of Chile and Argentina the chapter determines that 
border disputes were the main factor that disrupted efforts of alliance. Throughout the 
20th century, the repeated attempts to work together on territorial issues continuously 
resulted in poor trust and eventually aggravation almost to the point of war. The impact 
on each nation’s economy while trying to obtain oil and contested territories created 
social unrest over the decline in living standards. These impoverished living conditions 
supported overthrowing the democratic became a common theme, as Chile and Argentina 
struggled to right their failing democracies. The answer to creating bilateral relations 
came after attempts at third-party mediation, The Vatican was chosen to arbitrate a treaty. 
The Pope John Paul II delivered a strong well-balanced treaty but most importantly, the 
treaty introduced CBMs. The result of these CBMs came in the form of growth within 
Chile and Argentina’s economies and the establishment of stability on the southern cone. 
Overcoming the main factor of border disputes, allowed for follow-on effects of political 
stability and economic growth to occur unencumbered by previous hold ups, like in 
Antarctica. 
The race for Antarctica became a case of great power competition due to the 
interest in territory on the southern continent. The United States, United Kingdom, Chile, 
and Argentina all were determined to maintain their presence in the region, however once 
they learned that the cost-to-benefit ratio was high the situation defused and became too 
costly to sustain. As great power competition over Antarctica dissolved, Chile and 
Argentina returned to their neighboring border disputes amidst Patagonia and the Beagle 
Channel. The decreased drive to compete over Antarctica occurred due to lack of 
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resources available to support the cause. However, in the Beagle Channel, cases like 
Tierra del Fuego found that competition spiked after the discovery of oil. While in other 
cases, like the Laguna del Desierto incident, armed conflict occurred over the border 
tensions reached breaking points. This reveals the significance of the effectiveness in 
third-party intervention and the follow-on CBMs that were developed to prevent tensions 
over borders from forming again. 
Likewise, the political interests over the territories contested by Chile and 
Argentina, fueled the increasing tensions throughout the 20th century. For example, at the 
conclusion of Argentinian President Peron’s second term, political discourse was 
heightened by the ambitious General Aramburu who overthrew him. He increased 
military forces along the border in the interest of popular and economic gains. However, 
when the authoritarian government’s attempts failed at obtaining the land of quelling civil 
unrest, the political turmoil on drove the situation over border disputes further towards 
war. Following the intervention of the third-party actor, these uprisings were surprised, 
democracy was mostly restored to Chile and Argentina, and the Chilean and Argentinian 
governments were stabilized through effective CBMs.  
The introduction of the 1984 Peace and Friendship Treaty and CBMs not only 
settled the border disputes, but a keynote was that it opened the door to new opportunities 
for Chile and Argentina to form improved relationships. The cases of sharing gas and oil 
resources presents a strong trade alliance, which formed through the assistance of the 
CBMs. The impact of the FTA alone improved living conditions in Chile immensely and 
added to the regional stability that was already improving following the signing of the 
treaty. Another crucial but overlooked fact was the creation of the PANC, between Chile 
and Argentina who previously competed over the Antarctic. Along with their bilateral 
relations, the support provided from the United States and United Kingdom also prove 
the effectiveness the third-party meditation had a lasting impact of the CBMs.  
Overall, the Chile and Argentina case revealed the benefits of aligning two 
neighboring nations who may have had past differences. The case provides an example of 
an outcome that occurred after brining two neighboring countries, who share similar 
values, together under bilateral relations. The benefit to Chile and Argentina after the 
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third-party intervention and adoption of CBMs impacted both nations equally and fairly. 
The alliance removed the uncertainty of war over border claims, potential for political 
instability and lack of economic support. The addition of CBMs perpetuated the treaty’s 
conditions and continued to fuel the confident results felt by Chile and Argentina. The 
Chile and Argentina case presents a clear example of how two close, but differing nations 
can come together bilaterally, if the right conditions, such as third-party intervention, are 
met and can be followed through CBMs. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: ANALYSIS, FINDINGS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis aspired to create a positive bridge in a relationship that lacks the 
confidence of bilaterally aligned nations. It looked at the historical background along with 
some present-day factors influencing Japan–South Korea relations in order to determine 
how their conflicted situation came about. The thesis then compared the Japan–South 
Korea case to Chile and Argentina, a case where two nations were able to overcome their 
differences and grow into strong bilateral partners. This chapter provides the findings of 
the research, presents a comparative analysis of the two cases, followed by 
recommendations for how Japan and South Korea can find ways to improve relations in 
the future in light of the sources of reconciliation between Chile and Argentina. 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
The Japan–South Korea relationship is a complex case with various factors that 
contribute to their inability to align bilaterally. Japan and South Korea’s historical tensions 
were the main causal factor for their strained relations. The follow-on limitations of 
military to military cooperation and economic success were also impacted by the wartime 
atrocities factor. While the historical setbacks are clearly impeding Japan and South 
Korea’s potential for harmony, their economic partnership has reaped undeniable benefits. 
The prospect of mutual gains reveals that the likelihood of improvement is expected, 
because of the mutual benefit in economics between Japan–South Koreas limited relations. 
The Chile and Argentina case began with similar conditions that diverged relations, 
however theirs occurred over border tensions. The territorial disputes were comparable to 
the atrocities because they too drove the political and economic interactions of Chile and 
Argentina. The Chile-Argentina case presents evidence that third-party intervention 
assisted by CBMs can produce strong bilateral ties that benefit both parties. This study 
suggests that the Chile and Argentina case may provide guidelines to assist with improving 
the South Korea and Japan bilateral relationship. Implementing the lessons learned from 
the Chile-Argentina case into the Japan–South Korea case presents two possible outcomes: 
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one positive with Japan and South Korea as closer bilateral partners and the other leaving 
the two nations to continue their rocky relations to an unknown conclusion.  
B. SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN CASE 
Japan and South Korea’s tensions occur primarily over historical atrocities from 
WWII. Regional stability has, however, remained relatively calm due to several factors. 
One strong feature of Japan–South Korea relations has been their economic development. 
Japan and South Korea lean on one another for the resources they require to create their 
domestic products. For the most part Japan and South Korea have been able to do so 
without a formal trade agreement to officially mark their economic ties. However, in 
examples like the 2019 GSOMIA breakdown, South Korea threatened to divide the 
trilateral intelligence-sharing agreement of the United States, Japan, and South Korea, 
again due to historical controversies between Japan and South Korea. The result of 
maintaining unofficial trade agreements and mismatched investments yield significant 
economic repercussions because of their lack of improvement in their bilateral relations 
due to tensions surrounding historical controversies.  
 
Figure 7. 2017 Tri-carrier Operations Featuring the United States and South 
Korea Conducting Joint Show of Force Operations. 
Source: The South Korean Ministry of National Defense. 
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Japan and South Korea’s inability to look past wartime crimes also seeps into their 
military relationship and its potential conjunction with the United States. The examples of 
military cooperation between United States-Japan–South Korea reveal the interoperability 
of the two nations is not completely farfetched. By conducting trainings and joint 
operations with the United States on a yearly basis for the last few decades, it can be 
assumed that the Japan and South Korea could operate bilaterally independent of the United 
States, if necessary. However, the wartime atrocities of World War II prevent this from 
occurring and create a clear resistance to better mil-to-mil relations. Thus, presenting a 
fractured military alliance with the United States and weakened regional security 
cooperation.  
The main point of tension derives from issues such as, comfort women, forced 
slavery and the lack of respect towards historical events by Japan. These categories cause 
sour feelings to erupt from South Korea and at times retract progress that may have been 
gained over time. For example, in 2007, Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, 
with remarks contrary to the historical facts of World War II, sparked a resurgence of ill-
feelings between South Korea and Japan. The impact of the historical legacies between 
Japan and South Korea continue to set the stage for the follow-on factors that affect their 
relationship. 
During World War II, Japan violated many other nations, however South Korea felt 
the most victimized by the Japanese attacks and has refused to let that disrespect pass. The 
tension is integrated into all aspects of their relations and has rerouted many of their 
potential instances to join as bilateral partners. Since the turn of the century, East Asian 
has become a hotbed of military threats with the resurgence of Russia, China’s rise, and 
the nuclearization of North Korea. Logically, a Japan–South Korea bilateral security 
cooperation would make sense given their proximity to the threats and already standing 
bilateral relations with the United States. However, controversy over historical disputes 
has led to instability as each year passes. Japan and South Korea’s resistance to working 
alongside one another has stunted their national growth capacity and support of the United 
States. The contrasting case of Chile and Argentina lays out a similar case that concludes 
with a positive turnaround once the hurdle of border tensions was overcome.  
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C. CHILE-ARGENTINA CASE 
The Chile-Argentina case presented a reflection of the Japan–South Korea case, 
revealing two nations that were similarly divided over an issue, in this incident, border 
tensions. Antarctica became a frontier of great power competition as the United States and 
Great Britain entered the region. The diffusion of the great power competition only 
occurred when the external parties retracted their assertiveness on the territory, thus 
allowing Chile and Argentina to refocus their efforts on the southern cone. The Beagle 
Crisis caused follow-on effects reducing political stability and economic growth because 
no settlement could be reached over the territory.  
While political turmoil racked the two nations, the struggle for control of land 
furthered the chaotic situations. The coups that occurred following contention of the 
territories, like the 1959 Laguna del Desierto incident were examples of the inability for 
Chile and Argentina to solve their territorial disputes without assistance. The discovery of 
oil on the Tierra del Fuego, reignited tensions on the southern cone over whose claim was 
legitimate, giving Chile or Argentina the authority to begin unearthing the resources. The 
impact border tensions had on each nation’s economy, not only lessened growth, but left 
the population with less than desirable living conditions and without much support. The 
social unrest caused by these conditions only furthered the complexity of each nations 
political system and prolonged any chance of convening a successful end to the territorial 
disputes. 
Up to 1984 Chile and Argentina’s attempts to quell the domestic disputes were 
unsuccessful and showed no signs of slowing. In the 1980s, the international community 
stepped in once the threat of war reached its pinnacle and the third parties began working 
on potential meditation. However, Chile and Argentina’s previous territorial disputes with 
the United States and United Kingdom hampered their attempts at mitigation, leaving the 
Vatican as the optimal choice between the primarily Catholic nations. The addition of 
CBMs fortified the treaty’s terms and allowed trust form between Chile and Argentina’s 
bilateral interactions. Ultimately, the third-party mediation and implementation of CBMs 
created the atmosphere required for Chile and Argentina to cooperate under strong bilateral 
relations. 
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D. TWO POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS FOR JAPAN–SOUTH KOREA 
RELATIONS 
1. Factors That Could Cause Tensions to Continue or Lead To an All-Out 
Breakdown 
Of the outcomes Japan and South Korea face, the potential for continued divergent 
relations to occur is high without the intervention of a third-party. Prolonged separation of 
Japan and South Korea will begin form a cycle of continued tensions. If more instances of 
Japan’s leaders visiting controversial sites, like the Yasukuni shrine, or misrepresent 
historical facts in published textbooks occur, these relations may stagnate for a long time. 
The lack of an outside catalyst, such as a third-party, to prompt change could potentially 
leave the two nations with mutual tunnel vision on their past issues. Thus, disabling their 
ability for compromise or to make progression when attempting to move forward with their 
relationship.  
The potential for a stagnant cyclical relationship to form between the Japanese and 
South Koreans is evidenced by decades of attempted treaties and reparation that have come 
and gone. Multiple apologies by the Japanese have been found insufficient in the South 
Korean’s view and any additional tries could perpetuate the historical atrocities factor. The 
continued contention of wartime crimes could wash over into the military interactions and 
block any attempts at the improvement of relations. Persistence in tensions could also erode 
or at least lessen the economic interactions Japan and South Korea have outside of those 
supported by the United States and cause a loss in incentives to work together. The 
formation of a cyclical relationship with underlying tensions as a sticking point could leave 
Japan and South Korea with very limited and restricted interactions in the future. 
Also, breakdown in the economic partnership could force Japan and South Korea 
to consider other regional trade partners, like China, and leave the other in a desperate 
condition financially. The loose economic ties already possess great influence on the work 
and if those ties were to be cut it would require worldwide economic adjustments. 
Additionally, if any further breakdown in relations were to occur it could trample the 
remaining trust and leave the two less likely to realign as distant associates. As seen in the 
Chile-Argentina case, the lack of reinforced treaties and agreements created a cycle of 
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mistrust between the contesting nations. In the Japan–South Korea case it could be possible 
that reoccurring disputes over reparations pay for comfort women could lessen the trust 
Japan has for South Korea and their ability to uphold financial agreements.  
However, in a worst-case scenario, if Japan continues to display disrespect towards 
the historical atrocities and spur South Korean disapproval, the strained relationship may 
also reach a heightened state. As seen in the Chile-Argentina case, the continued disputes 
over borders drove the two nations to the brink of war. In the Japan–South Korea case, a 
collapse of the partnership between Japan, South Korea, and the United States may escalate 
the regional tensions to potential war. Currently, Japan and South Korea support the United 
States efforts in the region through indirect or supplemental support. Therefore, if South 
Korea were to fall out of the alliance and begin tighter relations with China it may tip the 
balance of powers in East Asia enough to lead to potential war.  
The budding chance of Japan and South Korea’s falling out yields multiple follow-
on effects that could impact the world. The security blanket provided by the U.S. through 
its bilateral relations with each country would be inconvenienced due to the additional 
measures it would have to take when working with each nation. The bearing economic 
ramifications would have on the world if a breakdown between the Japan–South Korean 
investments would severely degrade infrastructure the relationship holds together. The 
collapse of what limited interaction Japan and South Korea have now would also open 
more opportunities for regional challenges by countries like, China and Russia. This would 
leave Japan, South Korea and the United States scrambling to reestablish their identities 
and alliances in preparation for the shift in forces and capabilities. Ultimately, the world 
would lose significant privileges it has come to enjoy over the past 75 years if Japan and 
South Korea were unable to solve their tensions.  
2. Factors That Can Lead to More Amiable Relations and Potential 
Bilateral Agreement 
While there are many signs that point to Japan and South Korea remaining distant, 
there are some that counter that image. Their economic cooperation presents a strong 
example of how well South Korea and Japan can work together, given they have not signed 
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an official FTA. As previously stated, the military integration has become an annual routine 
reveals both nations already possess the capabilities needed to operate jointly. Additionally, 
in the past Japan and South Korea have come close to resolving their differences, like in 
2004 when they agreed to pay further reparations to settle the comfort women dispute. 
However, if third-party intervention had occurred there may have been a higher chance of 
creating agreements that were well balanced and maintainable. The Chile-Argentina case 
reveals that the implementation of CBMs is an added measure to ensure the sustainment of 
a treaty or agreement. The Japan–South Korea case would likely also benefit greatly from 
reinforced terms. 
Should the United States take a more active role in the matter, Japan and South 
Korea would perhaps have to consider more their strategic situations. Allowing the United 
States additional leverage into their domestic and neighboring disputes may cause 
additional tension in the region, leading to more imbalance in the alliances. Therefore, it 
may be better to consider intervention from a group such as the United Nations, with the 
focus of improving global politics, rather than a potentially misinterpreted grab for power 
by the United States as the mitigator. If the United Nations stepped in and led the discussion 
of bilaterally aligning Japan and South Korea, it would be imperative they ease the tensions 
over the wartime atrocities before they proceed with any further treaty terms. The factual 
history of World War II, along with Japanese and South Korean impressions of one 
another’s actions during the war would have to be considered and tactfully managed when 
defining terms in the treaty. 
Additionally, as the terms of the treaty are formulated, the UN would have to 
consider the sustainment of these terms. To do so, it would behoove the treaty to develop 
an atmosphere that allowed Japan and South Korea to repair the trust factor over time. The 
CBMs implemented would need to strengthen what infrastructure is already established 
and give the impression of visible improvements over time. Japan and South Korea’s 
economic ties already have positive tendencies, but could benefit from tangible 
improvements, like increased bilateral investments, spaced out enough to grow into the 
establishment of a Tokyo-Seoul FTA. Also, a step-up military alliance that would allow 
Japan and South Korea time to build up operational experience before a more substantial 
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cooperation in military affairs. As time passes the benefits felt by each nation would 
continue to perpetuate positive relations and ensure they do not slip back into a waning 
relationship. 
If the two nations under third-party intervention and the assistance of CBMs came 
together under a bilateral treaty, the benefits could be significant. The Asian-Pacific 
security umbrella between the United States, Japan and South Korea would be complete, 
allowing pressure to be taken off the U.S. for regional presence. An FTA could be officiated 
allowing secured investments to flourish and develop each nation’s GDPs further. 
Additionally, the historical atrocities could be laid to rest with the proper respect given by 
both sides and allow time to heal the past wounds. If South Korea were to forgive Japan 
for its past, it would set a new tone for other East and Southeast Asian nations to follow in 
future ventures.  
Ultimately, the Chile and Argentina case provided a strong contrast to the Japan–
South Korea case, as the former led to a resolution while the latter did not. That said, lines 
can be drawn from border tensions to historical atrocities, disrupted governments to 
military to military relations and sporadic economic agreements to positive trade trends 
that the two cases overlapped in enough respects for a comparison to be made. By utilizing 
Chile and Argentina’s results new avenues for solutions between Japan and South Korea 
have been established, and steps have been laid out of how they should proceed to bring 
their relationship closer. The effectiveness of third-party intervention and CBMs are 
revealed through Chile and Argentina’s ability to overcome their obstacles and move onto 
becoming strong bilateral partners. Their success reveals promise for Japan and South 
Korea if tools from Chile and Argentina’s case are applied correctly. If so, not only will 
Japan and South Korea, but the United States and the rest of the world will benefit 
immensely from their convergence in finally forming bilateral relations. 
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